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adequately protected in the initial proceeding. 0 If every possible means
of reaching the defendant have been exhausted, it would be unreasonable
for the court not to sustain the validity of constructive service. If it
were impossible to get a valid personal judgment under these circum-
stances, "it would seem that the plaintiff would be unduly burdened and
the defendant pemitted the advantage of a windfall gained through his
own undesirable conduct." 5'
JOAN G. BRANNON
Civil Procedure-Finality of Determinations under
Federal Rule 23(c) (1)
On January 11, 1966, two indictments alleging a criminal conspiracy
to monopolize the low pressure pipe industry were returned in the federal
District Court for New Jersey.- The defendants pled nolo contendere
and were sentenced on April 29, 1966.2 On April 28, 1967, the City of
New York, alleging the identical conspiracy, brought an antitrust action
against some of the defendants in the New Jersey criminal action." New
York City filed the complaint as representative for a Federal Rule
23(b) (3)4 class alleged to include "all state and municipal governments,
government agencies, authorities and subdivisions in the United States."'
This action was begun within one year following the end of a federal crim-
inal antitrust prosecution during which the running of the statute of
limitations is suspended.' The defendants moved to strike allegations of
r' For a similar conclusion reached by a state court, see Cradduck v. Financial
Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). But,
of course, the insured is his own best witness, and therefore it can be forcefully
argued that his interests can never be adequately protected without his presence.
" Comment, Personal J1trisdiction Over Absent Natural Persons, 44 CAL. L.
REv. 737, 742 (1956).
'United States v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., Criminal No. 9-66
(D.N.J., Apr. 29, 1966); United States v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.,
Criminal No. 10-66 (D.N.J., Apr. 29, 1966).
'See City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295,
296-97 (2d Cir. 1969).
'City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 67 Civil No. 1698
(S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 28, 1967).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
'City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 296
(2d Cir. 1969).
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15b, 16(b) (1964).
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class action by requesting the court to make a rule 23 (c) (1)' determina-
tion that the action could not be maintained in a representative capacity.
After a delay of several months to permit further discovery, the court
concluded that "treatment of this suit as a class action would not be
'superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy.' "8 From this order, interlocutory on its face, appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.9
The appellate court dismissed the appeal in City of New York v.
International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.'0 It held that a determination
under rule 23 (c) (1) is not ordinarily a final judgment from which appeal
may be taken under section 1291 of title 28 of the United States Code."1
The court found that the parties would be able to urge their respective
positions on a later appeal and would be unhindered by the denial of class
action. Nor did this denial effectively determine any collateral rights of
parties to the action. 2
The decision reiterated the fundamental principle that only an order
that is final as to parties, subject matter, and claims for relief is appeal-
able."s This principle-the final-judgment rule-is meant to increase the
efficiency and over-all fairness of both the trial and appellate courts.' 4
The rule eliminates not only disruptive appeals from interlocutory orders
that may be intended by one party to harass the opponent and to delay the
proceedings, but also unnecessary appeals on both procedural and sub-
stantive rulings that may be adverse to the eventual winner. The review
only of complete judgments provides appellate courts with an overview
I "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits." FED. R. Cry. P. 23(c) (1).
'City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 297
(2d Cir. 1969).
'The district judge did not make the certification of a controlling question of
law, permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964), that would have allowed immediate
appeal of the rule 23(c) (1) order. City of New York v. International Pipe &
Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1969).10410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
' "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final de-
cisions of the district courts of the United States, ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
"410 F.2d at 295. The interlocutory nature of affirmative rule 23(c)(1)
orders has not been questioned.
12Arnold v. United States ex rel. W. B. Guimarin & Co., 263 U.S. 427 (1923).
14See American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d
277, 280 (2d Cir. 1967); Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEXAS
L. REv. 292 (1966); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41
MixN. L. REv. 751 (1957).
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of the entire proceedings rather than a limited look at a portion of them."6
However, because the requirement of finality is to be construed in a
reasonable and liberal manner rather than a technical one, orders, other-
wise interlocutory, have been treated as final when they have effectively
decided the outcome of a case.1
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,'7 the Supreme Court
created an exception to the final-judgment rule. A New Jersey statute
provided defendants in certain types of stockholders' derivative suits
the right to a security bond for defense expenses. A federal court, exer-
cising diversity jurisdiction, denied a request for such a bond. The
defendants' appeal from this order was allowed. The Court held that this
order was one of a
... small class which finally determines claims of right, separable
from and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to
be denied review, and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi-
cated.1
8
This small class of appealable collateral orders was significantly en-
larged by Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,'9 in which the Court
held that the compelling considerations in deciding whether to accept an
appeal from an interlocutory order were "the inconvenience and costs of
review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice on the other."20
The Court based its decision upon the the merits of the case, rather
than a detached consideration of the finality of the order or the complete-
ness of the proceedings. A desire to do justice as the Court saw fit pre-
vailed over any question of jurisdictional niceties.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline2' first took up the finality and consequent
appealability of determinations under rule 23(c) (1). Eisen brought a
private antitrust action alleging a conspiracy to monopolize odd-lot trading
on the New York Stock Exchange. Eisen's personal damages amounted
to seventy dollars, but he filed his action as representative for a rule
5 Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Ride, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 292 (1966).
'" E.g., Kelly v. Greer, 354 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Cefaratti,
202 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
"337 U.S. 541 (1949).
'B Id. at 546.
10379 U.S. 148 (1964).
201d. at 152.
"' 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), denying motion to dismiss appeal from 41 F.R.D.
147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
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23(b) (3) class numbering several million people. Upon defendants'
motion, the allegation of class action was dismissed although the indi-
vidual claim (for seventy dollars) was allowed to stand.2 From this
order Eisen appealed. The court held that the dismissal of the allegation
of class action ended the lawsuit "for all practical purposes"-' and thus
was a final order, appealable as such. It found that "no lawyer of com-
petence is going to undertake this complex and costly case to recover $70
for Mr. Eisen."24 Disallowance of the suit as a class action would prevent
not only the adjudication of Eisen's substantive claims, but also any
review of the 23(c) (1) determination that decided the outcome of the
suit.25 The ruling of the trial court in Eisen was not a final determination
of a collateral issue, but was, in effect, a termination of the whole case. It
appears that the appeal was allowed because of the traditional construction
of the final-judgment rule in a "practical," "liberal," and "reasonable"
manner, not because the trial court's decision fell into the category of orders
excepted from the general rule by Cohen and Gillespie.
In City of New York v. International Pipe and Ceramics Corp.,26 the
court distinguished the fact situation from that in Eisen because the denial
of class-action status would not end the litigation. New York City had
alleged enough damages to warrant complete prosecution of the case
individually.27 It also had sufficient financial resources so that the loss of
class-action status would not influence the decision whether to continue
the suit.-2  Review of the rule 23(c) (1) determination would not be
prevented by failure to consider it immediately, but could be raised, if the
City should so desire, upon a later appeal. The only resulting harm to
New York City would be a loss of the bargaining power belonging to a
representative in a class action; however, a class action is not to be a
device by which bargaining power is increased. 9 The facts of Eisen are
not comparable; the city as plaintiff would continue the fight.
The holding in Eisen apparently will apply only if some purported
"2Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
' 2 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966).
2& Id.
2Id.
20410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
27 New York City alleged damages in excess of 520,000 dollars. Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeals for Martin Marietta Corporation, at 2,
City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.
1969).
28 410 F.2d at 301.21 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
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party is found who cannot assert his rights because of the denial of class
action. One day before the end of the one-year suspension of the statute
of limitations, New York City filed its suit as a class action. The bringing
of a sustainable class action tolls the statute for all members of the alleged
class. 30 Thirty-seven members of that class intervened in the suit after
the year was up.31 While such passage of time certainly puts a burden upon
the intervenors to rebut the effect of the statute of limitations, it can
hardly be said that the court's denial of class-action status to the suit
amounted to a final judgment as to their rights.
Conceivably some of the intervenors may have relied to their detriment
upon the class action by the city to toll the statute of limitations. There
was only one day between the filing of the class action and the end of
the year of grace in which other parties might have filed actions of their
own. Nevertheless, any equitable considerations-such as detrimental
reliance--on behalf of an intervening or non-intervening member of the
alleged class should be used as a defense against the statute of limitations
rather than as grounds to lower the requirements for a class action.
Other than by way of detrimental reliance, it would seem that no
intervenor could claim that his rights in the action were in any way
decided by the dismissal of the class allegations. This class was not the
type for which an aggregation of claims wvas necessary because each
member was as financially capable as New York City to continue the
suit and each of them had alleged substantial damages.2 3 If the statute
of limitations is held to bar their actions, they may take up the negative
rule 23(c) (1) determination on an appeal of the limitations holding.
Review will not be prevented, as it was in Eisen, by a dismissal of the
immediate appeal. The rule 23 (c) (1) determination cannot be considered
" Escott v. Bachris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied
sub nor., Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1966).
3" 410 F.2d at 297.
""[I]t may well be that ... an opportunity should be presented for proof of
reliance upon the pendency of the purported class action sufficient to toll the statute
of limitations. Any other approach would make it virtually mandatory for every
class member to file a cautionary separate action within the limitations period."
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 460 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
" The intervenor-plaintiffs included the states of Alaska, Ohio, and Wisconsin;
the cities of Detroit, Philadelphia, and Cleveland; and the Port of New York
Authority. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of Defendant Kerr Concrete
Pipe Company for an Order Determining that this Action is Not to be Maintained
as a Class Action by the City of New York, at 6-7, City of New York v. Inter-
national Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
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to be a final judgment, in either a practical or a technical sense, for any
of the named parties in the case.
In order to find the rule 23(c) (1) order a final judgment, there
must be discovered among the non-intervening, unnamed class members
at least one that had some right cut off. The Second Circuit had held
earlier that unnamed class members do not have a practical or legally
cognizable existence. In dismissing an appeal from a denial of a "spuri-
ous" class-action status, the court pointed out:
The defendants quite certainly aided the process of hypostasis of
these nameless and as yet disembodied spirits by christening them
"related defendants" . . . and treating them thereafter as persons, who,
as urged on this appeal, may forever forfeit their rights to review
unless now [the right is] claimed. 4
Judge Hays, in his dissent in International Pipe, suggested that the
rule 23(c) (1) determination was a final judgment for some of the un-
named class members, whose existence he seemed to accept. 5 He pointed
out that if New York City is individually successful on the merits, it will
have no reason to appeal the dismissal of class-action status. If the
intervenors prevail over a statute-of-limitations defense, they also will
have no cause to appeal the adverse decision under rule 23(c) (1). If
these two contingencies are realized, the unnamed class members will
lose any review of the denial of class-action status. Furthermore, if they
commence separate actions, they will have to prevail over the statute of
limitations. According to Judge Hays, the possibility will still remain
that some of the unnamed plaintiffs will have neither the financial resources
nor the damages at stake to justify individual litigation; class-action
status alone will permit them to litigate their rights. 6 Such unnamed
plaintiffs are the only parties whose rights may have been decided by the
rule 23(c) (1) order. Whether the representative plaintiffs ought to be
able to appeal this determination upon their behalf is the crucial issue.
New York City filed its complaint as representative for a Federal Rule
23(b) (3) class." An action under this provision is the successor of the
"All American Airways v. Eldred, 209 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir. 1954) (Clark,
C. J.).
" 410 F.2d at 300, 301 (Hays, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 301.
' Class Actions Maiwtainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
1970]
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so-called "spurious" class action, authorized under the old rule 23.8 The
essence of both the new and the old rules is that although the claims are
separate and distinct, there are issues of fact or law common to all
members of the alleged class.
Under the Federal Rules, there are procedures other than rule 23
(b) (3) class actions by which claims having common issues of fact or
law may be consolidated. An example is permissive intervention under
Federal Rule 24(b)," which permits a party having such claims to
prosecute them in the same proceedings with an action filed earlier by
a different litigant. Denial of permissive intervention often has been held
unappealable.40 Another procedure, permissive joinder under Federal
Rule 20, is most similar to those actions in which the class is the
defendant.4" However, the finality and consequent appealability of the
denial of consolidation under its aegis has apparently not been con-
sidered by any court.
The class action under rule 23(b) (3) was established for the con-
venience of the court and the benefit of the public.4" The courts have
permitted the use of the rule 23(b) (3) action and its predecessor in
order to dispose of any issue of fact or law for which an adequate repre-
sentative has come forward. The courts have pointed out that consolida-
tion of such claims relieves overcrowded calendars and helps to achieve
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters
pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of the members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
" [a class action may be maintained] . . . when the character of the right
sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3), 39 F.R.D. 69, 95 (1966) (emphasis added).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
" Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519 (1947);
Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Ride 24, 57 KY. L.J. 329,
368 nn.129 & 130 (1968).
"'FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
" Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 202 (1950).
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a fair adjudication of all claims.4 There is no right to maintain an action
as a representative of a rule 23(b) (3) type of class.44 Each claim to
be consolidated under authority of rule 23 (b) (3) is separate and distinct
and otherwise could be prosecuted to a complete and effective judgment.45
No party's rights are necessarily affected by exclusion from a 23 (b) (3)
class or by a refusal to recognize such a class. No party should be able
to claim a right to a procedure established for the convenience and
efficiency of the courts, especially when the procedure is found both in-
convenient and inefficient by the trial court itself, for whose particular
benefit it was created.
Another and more compelling purpose for the rule 23(b) (3) action
and its predecessor, the "spurious" class action, is that by permitting the
aggregation of many claims otherwise too small to justify individual
litigation, claimants are enabled collectively to enforce their rights.46
This procedure is especially useful in private enforcement of antitrust
legislation, a field in which the parties often have damages far too small
for litigation individually. Private enforcement of these semi-public
rights, induced by the provisions for treble damages and for adequate
attorney's fees, was contemplated as the chief means of carrying out the
policies of such legislation.47 Such considerations suggest that in anti-
trust cases, the public interest may best be served by permitting plaintiffs
to bring rule 23(b) (3) class actions as a matter of right.
This approach would, indeed, serve to facilitate private prosecutions.
However, there is a significant difference between consolidating cases
such as International Pipe and those such as Eisen. As noted previously,
in a case such as Eisen denial of class-action status will serve to terminate
the entire litigation because of the insignificance of the individual plain-
tiffs' damages. The same factors that cause the class action to be
necessary to induce private antitrust suits also require that denial of
this status be immediately appealable. The opposite is true with cases
48 Cf. Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740-41 (7th Cir. 1952).
"There may be a right to maintain a representative suit with regard to a rule
23(b) (1) type of class, and possibly with regard to a rule 23(b) (2) type of
class. In these types of classes no effective judgment can be given unless parties too
numerous to join are bound. This is not the case with the rule 23(b) (3) category.
" Cf. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
"Welsh, Class Actions Under New Rile 23 and Federal Statutes of Limita-
tion: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 Vii.. L. REv. 370, 385 (1968).
" Kalven & Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of a Class Suit, 8 U. CHI.
L. REv. 684, 717 (1941).
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like International Pipe. Any governmental agency or subdivision is likely
to be financially able to sustain protracted litigation. Since low pressure
and sewage pipes are used for large projects, any agency using them will
sustain substantial damages for excessive prices, easily enough damages
to warrant an individual suit.
The class action was not meant to be a device by which the statute
of limitations may be extended and the defendant confronted with a horde
of stale claims. "The theory [of the statute of limitations] is that even
if one has a just cause, it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice
to defend within the period of limitations and the right to be free from
stale claims comes in time to prevail over the right to prosecute them. ' 48
Any class action, however, fails to give the defendant notice that a par-
ticular claim will be prosecuted. Rather, a general warning of the type
of claim to be advanced by both named and unnamed parties is given.
The complex and protracted nature of antitrust litigation intensifies this
objection.49 Nevertheless, the statute is tolled for all members of the
class at the time of the filing of the class suit. 0 The tolling of the statute
in this manner thwarts in large part its purpose by allowing the resur-
rection of claims impossible in many circumstances to refute. To lower
the requirements for class actions in order to facilitate their use in tolling
the statute of limitations would further undermine the rationale of the
statute. The inability to toll the statute's running certainly hinders un-
named plaintiffs, and perhaps bars their claims, but these results should
not create a right to toll the statute by use of Federal Rule 23.
The trial court's determination under rule 2 3(c) (1), with regard to
an alleged rule 23(b) (3) class, is both discretionary and tentative.51
Significant discretion is given to the trial judge in making the decision.
The criteria for deciding whether a class action is superior to individual
actions are based in part upon subjective determinations by the judge of
questions of the difficulty of management of a class action and the de-
sirability of the concentration of litigation on the claims. The issues of
"8 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-
49 (1944) (emphasis added).
' Welsh, Class Actions Under New Ride 23 and Federal Statutes of Limita-
tions: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 VILL. L. REV. 370, 387 (1968).
" Escort v. Bachris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965). Judge
Friendly dissented vigorously from this part of the decision. Id. at 735.




fact and law will often be ready for trial on the merits before any con-
clusion as to the superiority of the class action can be made.52 Yet,
because of notice requirements and the inherent difference between liti-
gating as an individual plaintiff and as a class representative, some tenta-
tive decision must be reached early in the proceedings.53 Rule 23(c) (1)
provides that the determination may be altered or amended and may be
subject to such conditions as the intervention of additional representative
plaintiffs.
The judge's decision is by both its tentativeness and discretionary
nature excluded from immediate appeal. Except for abuse, discretionary
orders may not be appealed at any time.5 In International Pipe, the
issue of abuse of discretion was not raised. Orders subject to reconsidera-
tion and correction at the trial level also cannot be appealed. 5 The tenta-
tive nature of such orders is lost by appellate review unless the higher
court order is amendable by the trial court. A rule 23(c) (1) order is
correctable at the trial level up until trial on the merits. Only at that
point, even if there has been an abuse of discretion, does the trial
court lose its power to correct the order. By that time, however, allowing
an appeal no longer serves the purpose outlined in Gillespie v. United
States Steel Corp.56 No cost is saved, and no denial of justice threatened.
57
The same decision that will make binding the rule 23 (c) (1) determina-
tion will make the whole case immediately appealable as a final judgment
on the merits.
The order at issue in International Pipe was made upon the trial
judge's discretion with regard to the convenience and efficiency of his
own court. To subject a procedural order, especially one of so dis-
cretionary a nature as the rule 23 (c) (1) determination, to appellate super-
vision, as suggested by Judge Hays, is not in the public interest.58 Per-
mitting the appeal of such orders would subvert the authority and impair
the public respect for the trial courts, centralize legal power in the ap-
"Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Ride 23, 43 F.R.D.
39, 41-42 (1967).
Id. at 40-41.
"Cf., e.g., Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962).
"Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949); Frank,
Requiem for the Final Judginent Rile, 45 TEXAs L. REv. 292, 296 (1966).
"379 U.S. 148 (1964).
"See p. 628 supra.
"Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of the Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv.
751, 781-82 (1957).
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pellate bench, and multiply requests for ordinary and extraordinary
review beyond the capacity of appellate judges to consider them properly.59
HUGH J. BEARD, JR.
Civil Procedure-Specificity in Pleading under North Carolina
Rule 8(a) (1)
A problem now1 facing the North Carolina practitioner desiring
to bring an action is drafting a complaint 2 that will satisfy the require-
ments of rule 8(a) (1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
(NCRCP). The drafter is no longer required to set out "[a] plain and
concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action . . . ."4 but
rather is supposed to draft "[a] short and plain statement of the claim
sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the trans-
actions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to
be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... -i
Since the new North Carolina rules are based almost entirely on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure0 (FRCP), from which have de-
veloped a sizable body of case law, the North Carolina pleader could
rapidly determine the standard that he is required to meet in his complaint
were it not for the phrase "sufficiently particular to give the court and
the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions
" Id. at 779. The Second Circuit reiterated its limitation of the applicability of
Eisen in Carceres v. International Air Transport Ass'n, Civil Nos. 33433-39 (2d
Cir., Jan. 13, 1970), in which a similar appeal from a negative rul 23(c) (1)
determination was dismissed. Upon the authority of International Pipe, Judge Hays
reluctantly concurred.
'The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the General
Assembly during the 1967 session and were to become effective July 1, 1969. Ch.
954, § 10, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1354. The 1969 session of the General Assembly
postponed the effective date until January 1, 1970. Ch. 895, § 21, [1969] N.C. Sess.
L. -.
Throughout this note, in the interest of simplicity, the pleading alleging a
claim will be called a complaint; the pleading party, plaintiff; and the party attack-
ing the complaint, defendant.
'N.C.R. Civ. P. 1-84, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I (1969). The North Carolina rules
are basically the same as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; most of the differ-
ences between the two sets of rules are discussed herein.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-122 (1953) (repealed Jan. 1, 1970). This statute was
originally enacted August 18, 1868, as § 93 of the 1868 Code of Civil Procedure.
5 N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1).
FED. R. Civ. P. 1-86, 28 U.S.C., app., Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts (1964).
[Vol. 48
